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L’ HOMME COMPLET

• Is free will an illusion?
• How to talk philosophy
• Altering tack and vision
• Are we really all ugly?
• Ends justifying means

... and more
Our third issue goes from twenty-four to twenty-eight pages. This is due to the extremely positive response we are receiving and the contributions which continue to pour in. SHARE is the official platform of Philosophy Sharing Foundation. Its main aim is to disseminate articles and information which contribute to philosophical discussion and debate. The magazine adheres to no single creed and ideology, and thus its policy is to publish any type of article as long as it contains philosophical substance and argumentation. Philosophy Sharing Foundation may or may not agree with the opinions expressed in the published articles. The responsibility for the published material shall lie solely with its author.

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Letters to the Editor are very welcome:

PHILOSOPHY SHARING FOUNDATION
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We are pleased that the feedback we got has been quite positive and the magazine is rolling out its copies with a sharp increase in circulation and publication.

The current explosive political climate requires crucially clear and comprehensive analysis. Hamlet comes to mind, ‘that it has come to this.’ Recent events in the U.K. and its Brexit vote, in Bangladesh, Baghdad, Brussels, Paris, Turkey, Nice, in the United States of America, and more violent uprisings and rebellion elsewhere, call for an urgent need for serene reflection. The battle roar of silence is raising its lid.

It would be pointless to simply attempt to draw upon the dominant lexicon of hegemony and empire. ‘Words, words, words.’ Hamlet again.

The privileged classes only are initiated into these plausibility structures, if at all. In fact, this discourse was the actual cause of the problem in the first place and only adds insult to injury. This semantic arsenal does not have the means of address or the acumen to diagnose the problem.

Attempting to regurgitate institutional discourse that was actually the cause of this violence and despotism (that many refer to as ‘democracy’) has proved not only useless.
and totally detached from reality, but also actually serves to fan the flames of discontent and desperation, loading the proverbial camel with bales of straw.

The ‘tipping point’ has long been reached and by drawing upon the usual spin the political class only throw salt into the wounds of helplessness and desperation. This is not some simple impasse that can be addressed by spin. Truth is urgently needed. ‘This above all: to their own self be true.’

When people are willing to die to end their desperation caution is urgent. Many oppressed actually see their way out of this mess as being more dignified if they manage to inflict as much retributive damage perceived as ‘justice’ as they can on their way out. ‘In my heart there was a kind of fighting that would not let me sleep’.

Suicide missions are not just motivated by the deferred gratification of promises of virgins in paradise of people who have been radicalised or brainwashed after long periods of sexual depravation and assumed forecasts of material exclusion. Many secular suicide ‘missions’ are actually instantly gratified in their execution, when the act is rationalised and appraised as justified ethically and morally by absence of further alternative recourse. In some cases it may actually be considered as ‘discounted gratification’. The perpetrator of this envisaged course of action may actually feel a reasonably justified sense of accomplishment and fulfilment before actually undertaking the mission, relieving him/herself of desperation and feeling commitment to duty plausible enough to die for.

Note the African American surgical strikes in the United States of America against assumed direct agents of the repressive state apparatus. Ironically some of the respondents had actually belonged to the repressive apparatus as recently deliberated conscious career choices, but later felt alienated enough to oppose by premeditated violence leading probably to their own deaths. So this in itself is proof enough that the discourse of democracy, and the ruthless capitalism it serves, is despotic, violent and the actual cause of desperation in billions of people all over the globe.

What is needed is possibly more revolt, more rebellion, more levelling. Perhaps discarding the traditional ruling elites, perhaps discarding the institutional infrastructure that has exasperated the despotism, perhaps abandoning democracy altogether. New modes of thought, courageous and creative thinkers, and innovative economic models. Fear ought to be discarded. Perhaps we need to SHARE. ‘The rest is silence’.

Meinrad
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As flies to wanton boys are we to the gods. They kill us for their sport', Gloucester tells King Lear after his eyes have been pulled out. If there was any truth in Gloucester’s words, then the possibility of human freedom would be undermined. It would also be undermined if the idea of an evil god were to be replaced by the idea that all human beings are subject to Fate, and that any effort to alter or change the future is futile. For freedom is best seen as our ability to make things happen, a power we possess as rational beings to determine whether a given event occurs or whether it does not. Gloucester obviously does not think that we have this ability.

Free actions are not the result of randomness or chance. They follow deliberation and are guided by reason. To avoid being red-carded by the chairman, for example, I try to stick to the time-limit. If I don’t succeed, that wouldn’t show that I wasn’t free, or that I couldn’t have done better, that it ‘had to happen’, or that it somehow had to happen, that it was fated to happen, or that I could have done nothing to prevent it. More generally, although I cannot do anything now to change what happened in the past, it doesn’t follow that I could have done nothing before it happened to stop it from happening. Nor does it follow that my deliberations and decisions can make no difference to the future course of events.

The fact that human beings are free to decide and then, having decided, can still change their mind, explains why we can never predict human actions with the same degree of certainty.

What distinguishes us from ‘mere puppets’ or automata is our ability to control both ourselves and our destinies.

Gloucester versus Cassius: or is free will just an illusion?

By Prof. Joe Friggieri
We are moral beings motivated by reasons and capable of reflecting on our beliefs and desires.

Professor Joe Friggieri is a philosopher, poet, playwright and theatre director. His support for the Philosophy Sharing Foundation, both in Malta and in Gozo, is much appreciated.
If you have often worried about not knowing what a philosophical discourse is exactly, please put your mind at rest. Most philosophy aficionados, including some philosophy professionals, don’t either. Mastering a genuine philosophical discourse takes time and practice. In the meantime, the following few words may be of some assistance.

(In this context a ‘discourse’ is understood to mean any piece of literary composition whether it be a talk or a writing, and whether it is an essay, an article, a book, a dissertation, a treatise, a dialogue, a poem, an autobiography, an epistle, a meditation, a reflection, a story, and such like.)

Spotting the chink. Perhaps a good place to start forming an idea of what a philosophical discourse is would be by being able to spot at least the most common tactics which are frequently used to mask a discourse which is not philosophical (while perhaps presuming to be so).

These concern the use of linguistic terms which, though evoking some kind of philosophical imagery, are void of philosophical resonance.

There are mainly four types of tactics. The first is the use of the word ‘philosophy’ or any of its derivatives, the second is the use of a philosophical terminology, the third is the use of philosophical concepts, and the fourth is the mention of philosophers’ names and/or quotations from their works.

All such terms are used artificially. They are usually employed in order to give the impression that the whole discourse in which they appear is philosophical (when it might not be). One may easily spot them because they are utilized out of context and disjointedly as if they were pieces of stick-ons.

Detecting false colours. A second way how to recognise a discourse which is not philosophical is by knowing what a philosophical discourse never is. Some discourses that come our way might be quite sophisticated and apparently well reasoned. Nevertheless, the flaw marks may be found either in their suppositions, in their argumentation and/or in their objectives.

With regard to suppositions (or premises), if a discourse rests its case on some kind of baseless prejudice or belief (usually taken as perfectly obvious) rest assured that that discourse cannot be philosophical.

With regard to argumentation (or procedure), any one of five main shortcomings might be present in any unphilosophical discourse. First, when the arguments irrationally confuse things which have nothing to do with each other. Secondly, when the arguments turn and turn upon themselves without saying anything or going anywhere. Thirdly, when the arguments illogically draw a general rule from a particular instance or, inversely, judge a particular case by a general tenet. Fourthly, when the arguments decide (again, illogically) what is from what ought to be or from what can be. Lastly, when the arguments do not take into consideration relevant variables or ignore possibilities or probabilities which can possibly prove them wrong.

With regard to a discourse’s objectives, one may point out five main red areas. First, when a discourse has the (political) intention of directing the reader or listener towards a particular conclusion with the exclusion of any other. Secondly, when a discourse is intolerant towards arguments contrary to it. Thirdly, when a discourse leads to a (dogmatically) inflexible conclusion which permits no other development or discussion. Fourthly, when a discourse draws a conclusion which is (reductively) presented as the panacea of all problems. Lastly, when a discourse begins with a categorical conclusion and sets out to confirm it no matter what.

Getting down to business. There are at least five major elements which constitute a philosophical discourse. It proposes arguments from reason alone, it proceeds logically from one proposition to the other, it takes into account the alternatives of what it submits, it proves every part of its case, and arrives at clear and distinct conclusions. For our purposes, a brief explanation of each of these five elements will follow.

Arguments from reason alone exclude both contentions which are of a religious, mythical or purely poetical nature, and also claims which are mere suppositions, beliefs, prejudices or conjectures. Any proposition made must be rationally accounted for.

Secondly, with regard to logic, each successive proposition or statement of an argument must proceed logically and rationally from one another with each preceding one serving as a basis of the one following it. No proposition must be held as certain if its preceding one is a probability, and neither may it be held with certainty as a general fact if it rests on particular cases or judges particular instances on the basis or mere general statements. An is statement cannot be inferred from an ought one. Every logical argumentation must have propositions which are consistent with each other, every one of them validly proved rationally, and do not contradict known facts ascertained by other scientific disciplines.

Thirdly, if possible all alternatives to the proposed argument have to be taken into consideration, logically and rationally proving their unreliability.

Fourthly, proof of an argument must be drawn solely from reason. Resorting to some kind of authoritative source, to emotion or to a claim of ignorance is unacceptable.

Finally, with regard to conclusions, these must be self-evident, ensuing logically and rationally from the arguments proposed in the discourse.

To conclude, every philosophic discourse should always embrace a deep respect towards the reasoning powers of human beings and towards intellectual honesty. It is, after all, essentially a contribution to a common pursuit of a better understanding of reality.

Ilona Brincat studied philosophy on a personal basis. Her main areas of interest are logic and critical thinking.
When Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara was killed in October 1967, Jean-Paul Sartre remarked that “le Che était l’être humain le plus complet de notre époque” (Che was the most complete human being of our era). Complete? What ever did he mean?

Sartre had met Che for the first time in 1960 during the same days that Che’s famous iconic photograph by Alberto Korda was taken. Sartre had enough time to think about the Argentine before proffering the remark after his death. It was not made lightly. It seems that to Sartre’s mind to say that a human being was ‘complete’ meant very much (Andrew Leak, Sartre, London 2006: 10). Concluding his 1964 autobiography, The Words, Sartre writes: “If I relegate impossible Salvation to the room of [theatrical] accessories, what remains? A complete man, composed of all men and as good as all of them and no better than any.” In other words, a man without pretences; a man, Sartre specifies, again in The Words, who simply loves and lives.

Was it like this that Sartre beheld Che? Most likely. He perhaps saw in him the magnanimous, self-less, humble, self-sacrificing revolutionary that he was. A man unadorned, so to say. A man who stands on his own two feet. A man, Sartre would agree, unlike any of us. Che himself would have put it slightly differently. To him a complete man would essentially be someone who made the ‘I’ disappear into an ‘us’ (Peter McLaren, The Pedagogy of Revolution, Oxford 2001: 74–5). In 1953, at 25 years of age, Che wrote in his Motorcycle Diaries: “I die as a sacrifice to the genuine revolution of individual will”. A few years later, in 1956, he wrote in his final Cuaderno Filosófico: “There where love awakens dies the I, dark despot”. In 1960, following the successful Cuban revolution, he told medical students in Havana: “Individualism as such, as the isolated action of a person alone in a social environment, must disappear […]. Individualism tomorrow should be the proper utilization of the whole individual to the absolute benefit of the community”.

The terminology used by Che here seems uncannily imbued with religious symbolism, as Jon Lee Anderson, Che’s major English-speaking biographer, pointed out (Che: A Revolutionary Life, London, 1997, 2010: 230). He may be right. The words are reminiscent of Jesus’: “Unless a kernel of wheat falls to the ground and dies ...” (John 12:24). The imagery, Che’s as much as Sartre’s, is evocative of a salvific figure.

Perhaps one should not be too surprised by this. Throughout history most of the several people who had been deemed ‘complete’ were religious people, such as Moses, Siddhārtha, Jesus, Mohammed and Gandhi, amongst others. The concept of human completeness certainly did not originate with Sartre, who might even had borrowed it directly from Camus, who, in The Fall (1956), for instance, exclaims through one of his characters: “I dreamed [...] of being a complete man who managed to make himself respected in his person as well as in his profession”.

In ancient times Confucius had already spoke of such a human being. In The Analects (475–221 BCE) we find the following passage (Book 14):

Tsze-lû asked what constituted a complete man. Confucius said: “Suppose a man with the knowledge of Tsang Wû-chung, the freedom from covetousness of Kung-ch’o, the bravery of Chwang of Pien, and the varied talents of Zan Ch’iû; add to these the accomplishments of the rules of propriety and music; such a one might be reckoned a complete man.” He then added, “But what is the necessity for a complete man of the present day to have all these things? The man, who in the view of gain, thinks of righteousness; who in the view of danger is prepared to give up his life; and who does not forget an old agreement however far back it extends; such a man may be reckoned a complete man.”

More recently, various other French authors in diverse academic fields had employed the concept in their intellectual and practical endeavours. For instance, the poet and critic Stéphane Mallarmé in the 1860s (L’action pour tous), the philosopher and writer Pierre-Yves Nizan in the mid-1930s (Marisa Farraini, Antoine Bloyé, 1988) and the sociologist Marcel Mauss around the 1940s (Sociologie et Anthropologie) all made frequent use of the terms ‘homme complet’ (or, alternatively, ‘homme total’).

What, exactly, did they mean? Such ‘completeness’, much as Confucius, Camus, Sartre and others used it in reference to individual human beings, is evidently a relative term and must be accepted with much qualification, if at all. A case in point would be Che himself who some would hesitate calling him a complete human being if the terms remained undefined.
Objectively, can a complete human being exist? Though there might be possible degrees of ‘completeness’, the question remains what is it made up of. Maturity? Freedom? Love? Any one of these concepts is loaded with an infinity of possibilities which certainly make completeness itself infinite in options.

Towards the end of his life in 1980, in an interview with Michel Rybalka and colleagues, Sartre said: “I have always been in agreement with the anarchists, who were the only ones who understood the complete man, formed by social action, whose principal characteristic is freedom” (Magazine Litteraire, 182, 1982: 75–6).

L’homme complet might not exist at all except as an ideal. What certainly exists is an admiration for certain people (who will probably turn out to be all that one is not — like Che was to Sartre).

If only Sartre had added “Pour moi” before his remark on Che! That would have been perfectly acceptable, for sure.

Antonio González Díaz studied philosophy at the Universidad Complutense de Madrid. He is very much interested in the social edge of information technology, and follows Malta’s philosophical scene most keenly.
Within Gozo a new civic society has grown. Philosophy Sharing Gozo has created a public space for philosophical deliberation, a space where one does not have to be a bookworm or a philosophy student to participate. Perhaps the essence of philosophy is to push oneself to think, deliberate and question the very essence of our lives. One of the foundation’s aims is to create this environment for Gozitans, a society that has been thwarted by partisan politics for so long, a society that is very different from its Maltese neighbors. Gozitans find it hard to speak up, complain or question their very existence.

The public talks this society will be hosting every first Friday of the month will create the space for anyone to attend and be challenged, whatever the subject may be. Philosophy is not only theoretical arguments but a way of life, trying to understand it better, and hopefully live it more to the full.

The first talk was presented by Dr Mark Montebello on “Should we always obey?” He discussed the concept of obedience through a variety of perspectives. The second talk was delivered by Prof. Joe Friggieri who reviewed a number of works of art and provided the audience with some conception tools with which to understand them better. The last talk was by Dr Jean Buttigieg on ‘Privacy in Cyberspace’, during which he encouraged the audience to question whether their lives were actually private or public?

All of these talks were extremely interesting and intriguing. The discussions which followed proved how people can be fascinated when listening to talks which stimulate the mind and throw open the doors of the imagination and the intellect.

Anyone is welcome to attend these public talks. They are held in English for the benefit of foreign residents in Gozo. This is a new experience which you should share.

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By Manuel Xuereb
After many centuries of apparent stolid conservatism in Malta, the 1950’s and 60’s offered some seemingly exciting change. Accrued and incubated enlightenment rationality seemed to have finally started to flourish in Malta as many academics have observed. Richard England in architecture, Francis Ebejer in literature, Cecil Satariano in film, Antoine Camilleri in art, and Peter Serracino Inglott in philosophy, among others, all leaving their distinct marked break with traditional modes of production.

Rather than catching up with our European neighbours, we seem to have attempted to take the short cut to the future via skipping stages.

Today, the sceptical and conspiracy theorists might appear justified to allege the scene seems dominated by charades, posers, simulacra, and sheer nonsense. The actual intellectual crime-scene forensic evidence may seem to corroborate apparent change that may even appear prima facie as invigoratingly ‘radical’. The ubiquity of art galleries, exhibitions, publications, fairs, reading vigils, theatres, orchestras, and much more, all seem to infer a vibrant art scene at par with our European and more distant peers. All this hyper activity seems to share a spontaneity and contemporaneousness with discourse of the most intellectually stimulating citations and radical international names. But have our artists left their mark on the international stage beyond the choreography of exhibitions and marketing, and sycophantic or charitable reviews?

Admittedly, there may be some truth that in the recent past we seemed to face an economy of scales that left us Maltese with the worst of both ends – a restricted talent pool and a restricted market. However, today sheer fortune has relieved us of this impasse by the globalisation features of technological communication. This access notwithstanding, why haven’t individual Maltese artists made their presence felt on the international market in acknowledged prestigious venues and stages and formally recognised schemes?

If the 50’s and 60’s represented international breakthroughs for Maltese artists in a number of fields, why don’t we see any international current recognition of art production? Over the next issues I will be trawling through these tides of change in search of the kernel of truth.

Sophie Manduca studied philosophy at the University of Cracow, Poland.
She lives and works in Chelsea, London.
These few words are not about the conversion to Catholicism of John Henry Newman (1801–1890). They are about one of the intellectual procedures which made him do so. One might find it interesting and even useful.

A middle-class London Anglican by birth, it can be taken as certain that Newman’s conversion in 1843 at the age of 42 had been a most momentous point in his 89-year-long life. That is to say, it had been no trivial matter, and needs be taken as something which had been very serious indeed. This only goes on to point out that what induced him to do so must have been very intense too.

Newman had studied at Oxford since the age of 15. After being ordained a minister and served in a parish, he was appointed a Tutor at Oxford’s Oriel College, then Vicar of St. Mary’s, Oxford’s university church. With his intelligence, eloquence and wit he led a group of intellectuals—called the Oxford Movement—to reclaim the Anglican Church’s prophetic role which was being threatened by political compromises. With Newman at the fore, the movement was extremely critical of the Church and vowed to restore its pristine beauty by leading it towards a ‘middle way’ (via media) between Puritanism, which was thought as discarding ancient traditions, and Roman Catholicism, which was seen as corrupting them.

Ever interested in Christian history, as part of his reformative efforts Newman undertook the concentrated study of the Fathers of the Church, that is, the study of the best Christian minds before the great schisms of 1054 and 1517, Orthodox and Protestant respectively, which split the Christian Church in three. His main intent was to prove that the Anglican Church was the only true, authentic Christian Church.

This was his undoing. For, while studying the Monophysite heresy, it suddenly occurred to him that the Monophysites also had followed a via media between Rome and the heretical Eutychians. Newman conducted a thought experiment by mentally positioning himself in the shoes of a 5th-century Christian intellectual and theologian confronted with the issues of the day. “Would have I been Monophysite or Catholic?” he bravely asked himself.

Newman’s qualified, though utterly sincere, answer was clear. He would have undoubtedly opted for the latter, and this shook him to the core. “I saw my face in the mirror,” he wrote years later in his 1864 Apologia Pro Vita Sua, “and I was a Monophysite”.

Resolved on proving himself wrong, further study brought Newman to the 4th-century Arian heresy. Again he conducted his ‘repositioning’ technique, and the result came out the same, only tougher. “In the Arian history,” he confessed in Apologia, “I found the very same phenomenon, in a far bolder shape, which I had found in the Monophysite. […] The pure Arians were the Protestants, the semi-Arians were the Anglicans, and […] Rome now was what it was”.

That was the final blow to his via media theory together with his Anglicanism. It marked the final turn in his long
and arduous “course of that great revolution of mind,” he admitted in Apologia, “which led me to leave my own home, to which I was bound by so many strong and tender ties”.

Much as Newman’s, the ‘repositioning’ thought experiment demands intellectual honesty as much as daring sincerity. It is an exercise of the imagination, to be sure, though one which involves more than idle fancy. It is putting on hold not merely one’s intellect, as if it was frozen in time, but rather one’s whole existence; a reckoning initially severed from the will in a sort of ‘inverted projection’. Whereas usually projection, as Feuerbach surmised in The Essence of Christianity (1841), is a psychological defence mechanism against one’s own unpleasant impulses by denying their existence while attributing them to others—as Freud famously conceptualised in Further Remarks on the Neuro-Psychoses of Defence of 1896—Newman’s technique suggests the opposite. His is a self-accusatory mechanism, or at least a rigorous self-critical device, which acknowledges one’s own intellectual leanings in others, whether friends or foes. The practice is mainly used to test one’s own waters and more so to signal them out upon a kaleidoscope of wits and undertakings.

To actually act upon the soundings, as Newman boldly did, is another matter altogether proper to a successive stage in the process, one which requires an overall different set of tools. Foremost amongst these is the will, together with the concrete ability, to switch sides if need be or, at least, to radically re-invent oneself.

Without diminishing the anguish demanded by the repositioning technique when undertook, this latter stage is by far not easier indeed. It comprises more than just a sheltered intellectual undertaking. As in Newman’s case, it may eventually come to ‘leaving one’s own home’, where ‘home’ would refer not merely to the psychology of space as Gaston Bachelard might suggest but rather to an ontology of the self in a more Kierkegaardian sense (or an ‘ontology of the present’, as Foucault might prefer). It would mean uprooting oneself and, so to say, pitching one’s tent elsewhere. This claims much nerve.

One final point. Could have Newman evaded such an exercise and its aftermaths? Probably not. Perhaps unknowingly he was moving in that direction all along. As shocking as this might sound, maybe it was just a matter of time. It might have only waited for mettle and audacity to catch up. Much of these were called for.

Ultimately, all this is about the valour to be what one should have been from the start.

Norman Croft, a Scottish permanent resident in Gozo, is a follower of our foundation’s work in Malta’s sister island.
It is quite common that philosophy enthusiasts, especially beginners, sometimes find names and labels of philosophers and philosophies very daunting. For their benefit we present here a bird’s-eye view of Contemporary Philosophy which they might find useful. Of course, it is just a sketch which does not go into much detail. It only shows principal schools of thought and their main exponents.

Kant worked during the wake of the French Revolution and the reforms wrought by Napoleon Bonaparte. Though Hume awakened him from his “dogmatic slumber”, it was Napoleon who personified Kant’s sharp, bold and far-reaching, philosophical advances.

**Existentialism**
- **Nietzsche**
- **Heidegger**
- **Sartre, De Beauvoir**

**Continental Philosophy**

**German Existentialism**
- **Heidegger**

**French Existentialism**
- **Sartre, De Beauvoir**

**Phenomenology**
- **Brentano, Meinong, Husserl**

**Dialectic**
- **Hegel**

**Analytic Philosophy**

**Critical Realism**
- **Lovejoy, Santayana, Broad**

**Logic & Mathematics**
- **Frege, Russell, Whitehead**

**Philosophical Analysis**
- **Moore, Russell**

**Utilitarianism**
- **Bentham, Mill, Stuart Mill**

**Pragmatism**
- **Pierce, James, Dewey**

**Immanuel Kant** (1724–1804) triggered off a new age in the Western philosophical tradition which, by time, echoed throughout the world. Two great movements ensued, the ‘Continental’ and the ‘Analytic’. Each branched out in two further advances which continue up till this day.
Since Plato in the 4th century BCE, the only real great innovator of thought in the West was Immanuel Kant in the late 18th-century. In some way or another we are all in his debt. He may not have been always irreproachable in his conclusions nor always consistent in his judgements. Nonetheless, we still live in his inescapable glow, and no end is yet in sight.

“ALL OUR KNOWLEDGE BEGINS WITH SENSE, PROCEEDS THEREFROM TO UNDERSTANDING, AND ENDS WITH REASON, BEYOND WHICH NOTHING HIGHER CAN BE DISCOVERED IN THE HUMAN MIND.”

Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, I.3.12.A.
Very little is it known about the fact perhaps that Sartre was obsessed with ugliness. He seriously believed himself to be physically (or, more precisely, facially) ugly, and also that all existence was ugly. He seemed to have felt a sort of doom about this; a fate he and all other human beings (nay, all existence) shared and, however great the effort, could not escape from. Instead, it appears that (as he seemed to have suggested) Sartre’s whole philosophical and literary endeavour—not to mention his chronic womenising and his general relationship to people—was a way of bearing (some would say sublimising) the ugliness he thought he was pleagued with. At other times, however, he seemed to have denied its existence all together. Ugliness for Sartre could have been Being itself. But it could have also been nothingness. Almost certainly it was an incurable nausea. Are we indeed all so ugly?

It is a well known fact that Socrates was physically ugly. In Plato’s Theaetetus, for instance, Socrates asks a teacher whether he knew of any promising youths. The teacher recalls a particularly smart boy (143d): “He is no beauty, and you must not be offended if I say that he is very like you; for he has a snub nose and projecting eyes, although these features are less marked in him than in you.” How’s that for frankness? And the teacher was probably being charitable. Nonetheless, as Peter Kreeft argues (Socrates meets Sartre, 2005), though things stood so dismal with him Socrates seems not to have sent all people to hell for that matter (or, like Sartre, heap them all up as one living hell). On the contrary, it projected him to contemplate the beauty of the metaphysical world, a point certainly not lost on Plato. But Sartre took a different turn. Being only five foot three, he must have been more or less as short as Socrates (though apparently not so stout). However, though his nose was not a mess, and neither did he have ridiculously fleshy lips, Sartre’s wide-set eyes and strabismus certainly came close, if not worse, to the great Athenian’s unsightliness. Nevertheless, it seems that both made an issue out of it though in quite different ways. Sartre, as Joseph Castalano reminds us (Reading Sartre, 2010), “gloried” in his ugliness. Ugliness came to Sartre—or so he was fond of reporting—when he was seven years of age, the result of ... a haircut. He assures us that he was a cute little angel before the clip; a cherub with golden locks. Very much like a girl, actually. And it was precisely this which apparently irked his grandfather who lured the unsuspecting seraph into the barber’s seat and demanded a restyle. The cherubin was trimmed of his feathery wings and ... became hideously ugly.

Though we might be tempted not to gulp this fable whole (you’ll do well not to), in his 1963 autobiographical Les Mots Sartre swears it left him devastated. Another moot point. For Christina Howells assures us (Sartre, 1995) that Sartre-the-child was not aware of anything amiss with his physical appearance, let alone being traumatised. It was Sartre-the-adult who made a mountain out of it. Howells rather sees more reason for worry in Sartre’s rejection by other children. His strangeness seemed to have made him invisible to them, whom they instinctively appear to have judged him as ‘inauthentic’ and an ‘imposture’. Jean-Pierre Boulé goes a step further (Sartre, Self-formation and Masculinities, 2005) when he insists that Sartre’s was wholly “perceived ugliness”; was just an impression. Not, of course, for that matter any less disturbing, for that matter. Anyway, Clive James is sure (Slate, March 2007) that it was this sense of elemental void, this essential obnoxiousness (whatever its origin), that Sartre famously called ‘nothingness’. We are nothing because we are ugly. We are ugly because we are false and nothing more than one whole pitiful masquerade. Ack! Could it get any worse?

“My ugliness,” Sartre said, “protected me from becoming precious. The guy [or lady] who doesn’t feel ugly is at best a reformist, because fundamentally, in his [or her] life, all is okay” (interviewed by John Gerassi, Jean-Paul Sartre, Vol.1, 1989).

Though not necessarily so (for one can be a reformist and good-looking; take Žižek, for instance), Sartre of
Sartre the ugly

By Dr Mark Montebello

course drives at something deeper: perhaps, namely, at our choosing to mould ourselves either into passive conformers or into active changers; into mere consumers or into (at least also) producers. In other words, what do we opt to be: beautifully complacent or unpleasantly (‘uglily’) rebellious? For Sartre, however, the extremes of such an alternative might have been wider apart still. As Katherine J. Morris observes (‘The graceful, the ungraceful and the disgraceful’, Reading Sartre, ed. by Jonathan Webber, 2011), the phenomenological concept of ugliness in Sartre gravitates “between the two poles of ‘mechanical rigidity’ and ‘unjustifiable contingency’”. That is, ugliness gravitates between absolute submissiveness and unattainable dreaming.

Sartre would presumably refuse both (as any sensible person should). But perhaps he would not have not objected to us being chronically dissenting folks. He might even have agreed that this was precisely how the pain of ugliness could be overcome. By denying it. Maybe it was for this reason that Sartre considered his physical ugliness (but also his pain, both physical and psychic) as “porous” and “almost elusive”, as Simone de Beauvoir had noticed (The Prime of Life, 1960). Sartre never allowed his ugliness to pin him down, as Hazel E. Barnes sustains (‘Simone de Beauvoir’s autobiography as a biography of Sartre’, Sartre’s French Contemporaries and Enduring Influences, ed. by William L. McBride, 1997).

Though some of us might be indeed handsome and even striking in our appearance, perhaps none of us can avoid being phenomenologically ugly. “Thinking, serious, sustained questioning,” Andy Martin suggests (Sartre vs Camus, 2012), “arises out of [...] consciousness of one’s own ugliness.” This might be more reason for us to make a greater effort to outdo ourselves and outshine existence. Both Socrates and Sartre would surely have agreed.

Dr Mark Montebello is visiting lecturer at the University of Malta.
There are two main types of systems with which Greek words are transcribed into modern languages. They are called the Reuchlin-Henning system, and the Erasmus system.

For various reasons (which are not necessarily the best), the Erasmus system, created in 1528, might be the most popular. First and foremost because it was the most used in ecclesiastical circles and amongst the clergy, thus making it the most prevalently used in philosophical texts, particularly in Malta. Nevertheless, it is probably the worse of the three systems since it has little regard to Greek phonetics. For all his worth, by sacrificing the original phonetical sounds, Desiderius Erasmus (1466–1536) created a system which was easy to pronounce by Westerners who had no idea of Greek. It is mainly for this reason that his system is so widespread amongst amateurs.

The other system, created by Johann Reuchlin (1455–1522) in 1519 and refined by Henry Christian Henning (c.1655–1703) in 1684, is held to be much more precise and correct. This is the most accepted by professionals. It is sometimes called the ‘ita’ system, since it

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**Transliteration of Greek diphthongs and double letters into Maltese**

*Pronunciation follows suit*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Greek</th>
<th>Maltese</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>αι</td>
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<td>σσ</td>
<td>= s</td>
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*αι at the end of a word*
transliterates the Greek letter η as ita, whereas Erasmus transliterates it as eta (and hence his is sometimes called the ‘eta’ system).

The tables indicate the correct method with which Greek words are to be transliterated into Maltese according to the Reuchlin-Henning system. Much inconsistency and arbitrariness exists amongst Maltese academics, including philosophers, in transliterating Greek words, as well as proper names, into Maltese. This is not good, especially for philosophy for which Greek is a foundational idiom. It is hoped that the simple transliteration system provided here will contribute to the formation of some kind of standarisation in this regard.

### Transliteration of Greek suffixes into Maltese

*Pronunciation follows suit*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Greek suffix</th>
<th>Transliteration into Maltese</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-ας (as)</td>
<td>-a</td>
<td>Πρωταγόρας = Protagora</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-εα (ea)</td>
<td>-eja</td>
<td>Ηρακλέα = Irakleja</td>
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<tr>
<td>-ες (es)</td>
<td>-e</td>
<td>Αριστείδες = Aristide</td>
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<td>-ευς (eus)</td>
<td>-ew</td>
<td>Ορφεύς = Orfew</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-σως (eos)</td>
<td>-ew</td>
<td>Σως = Zew</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-τας (ias)</td>
<td>-ja</td>
<td>Μελισσας = Melisja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-ιος (ios)</td>
<td>-ju</td>
<td>Ασκληπιος = Asklipju</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-ις (is)</td>
<td>-i</td>
<td>Ἱλις = Ili</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-ης (is)</td>
<td>-i</td>
<td>Λαχης = Laki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-η (i)</td>
<td>-i</td>
<td>Τρακη = Traki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-ος (os)</td>
<td>-u</td>
<td>Λυσιμαχος = Lisimaku</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-ους (us)</td>
<td>-u</td>
<td>Μυρρινους = Mirrinu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-ον (on)</td>
<td>-un</td>
<td>Πλατων = Platun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-σς (ós)</td>
<td>-us</td>
<td>Κως = Kus</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
We are hunters and predators walking on two legs. We are good in our trade and the proof of that is that we are still here after all these millennia. We do things with our hands but we plan and act using our brains. As a race we assume that we are at the top of the evolution ladder by divine design; masters of this world. We look at the stars and dream to be among them one day. As long as we dream and have the will to hunt we are still in the game. The only real and present danger to all this is us.

Individually we are weak creatures. To compensate for our human limitations and in order to survive we came together, and together we evolved. But in order to live together we had to create a system of ideas which define our social conduct of what is right and what is wrong, of what is good and what is evil. For centuries this cathedral was known as morality and served as the backbone for any community by providing unity and a relative stability.

Morality is a by-product of human evolution, which is subject to change by forces acting on both the individual and at a group levels. Fears, hopes, needs of different groups/communities differ from one another and, for this reason, they develop different codes of conduct. For example, in one place the ability to lie cleverly and to cheat skilfully are virtues to be cultivated. In other places they are regarded as dishonourable and shameful. To care for the aged was a sacred duty in one country but in another it was/is a social duty to get rid of them. All are ‘prospectives’ which can be fully understood only from within that unique social/community structure, that unique entity which is created by the unity of unique individuals; communities which came together united, again, by (or under) a common interest to form a higher entity, which is the State. Each have there own interests, exist and inter-act within there own paradigm.

Basically, any form of community presumably needs a form of leadership in order to provide it with a goal, guidance and protection. One can say that the wholeness of the collectivity is virtually divided amongst the main body, which is formed by the unity of free entities, and those who are chosen from their ranks to lead them. Figuratively speaking, one coin, two faces, but one value.

As a race we are obsessed with power. In one way or another we are hungry for it. Machiavelli’s The Prince is a book about power for those who are in a position of leadership or have the ambition to be part of the ‘elite’, and for those who view the world as a battlefield where everyone is engaged in a game for power. This book may be perceived and used as a manual on how to achieve, preserve and enhance power. It poses questions which challenge our morality.

One of the main themes suggested in The Prince is that the end justifies the means. If we reformulate this famous maxim into a question and ask if we agree with it or not we may face a moral dilemma which cannot be easily answered for the simple reason that there are many valid points of view which need to be considered. The moral issue then becomes a relative one.

The State, as the embodiment of the collectivity, cannot promote or tolerate the mentality that the means justifies the means. Some reasons may be:

Finish the Job (2011) by Oliver Munday (New York).
• Any ‘community’ is formed by the unity of free individuals.
• The ‘self’ is bonded with the existence of others.
• Individual actions are perceived and amplified within the community, the outcome of which will create distrust and disunity.

This is a view of a world composed of free States which, individually, are living entities, entities which interact with each other and with each one’s needs and ambitions. Every one of them is the embodiment of a unique mixture of cultures built along centuries.

A community provides a form of security which we need. However, if there are not any rules which regulate the interaction between its members that same structure will become an agent of its own destruction. It is for this reason that the end cannot justify the means. The integrity of the structure is imperative.

On the other hand, the freedom of the State from interference from external forces, and the promotion of the interests of the collectivity, remains the main function of its leadership, and in this sense, yes, the end appears to justify the means.

By Alfred Zammit

In short, any action inspired by the statement ‘the end justifies the means’, which aims at achieving results within the structure while disregarding the existence of others, will undermine the primary reason why a community exists, which is survival. These are elements which bond us together and, when we came together, make us as one. We came together as a group, a family, a community, a nation. Compare this to the individual person, who is on a higher level, where the collectivity becomes a single living entity.

As said before, these communities need leadership in order to survive. And they have to choose their leaders from within their ranks. Their function should be that of promoting the interests of their people against other entities.

And here we can ask the same question: Can the morality which regulates the social order within a community be applicable to their leader when s/he is dealing with external entities?

With regard to the political and business paradigm the question answered here deals with what now is known as the ‘dirty hand theory’. If we use this platform the question should be reformulated to reflect the stated context: Should political leaders violate the deepest constraints of morality in order to achieve greater goods or avoid disaster for their communities?

My answer is that any leader is morally obliged to do so. One may further ask: What is the use of morality if the head the community/state/family/group is above it? The answer is probably that s/he is not above it at all. S/he operates/acts on a different level. Such action by a leader, when directed towards protecting and promoting the interests of dependents/citizens, is, in my view, permissible.

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Alfred Zammit is a regular follower of our foundation’s activities in Malta, a former member of its Steering Committee, and a persistent philosophy learner.
“The Maltese are philosophers,” he said

John of Constantinople (ca. 349–407) is held to be an important early Christian Church Father. Known for his eloquence, he was given the epithet ‘Chrysostom’, which in Greek means ‘golden-mouthed’.

In a homily interpreting the shipwreck of Paul the Apostle at Malta, John Chrysostom makes an interesting remark on the inhabitants of the island. The homily (known as Number 54) is a commentary on Chapter 28 of the Bible’s Acts of the Apostles, the latter being a text written around 60/61 CE.

The story narrates that, following the shipwreck, Paul gathered some sticks and laid them on a fire. Inadvertently, he had also grabbed a viper which, on feeling the heat, sprang out, fastened itself on Paul’s hand, and bit him. Verse 4 of Chapter 28 recounts: “When the barbarians [i.e. the non-Greek speaking people] saw the creature hanging from his hand, they told one another, ‘No doubt, this man must be a murderer! For though he may have escaped the sea, Diki [i.e. the goddess of Justice or Vengeance] won’t let him live.’”

Commenting, Chrysostom observes: “The islanders do not simply pronounce their judgment, but say, ‘No doubt’—that is, ‘as anyone may see’—‘Vengeance,’ say they, ‘suffers him not to live.’”

“Why, then,” continues Chrysostom, “they held also the doctrine of a Providence, and these barbarians were far more philosophic than the philosophers themselves, who allow not the benefit of a Providence to extend to things below the moon: whereas these barbarians suppose God to be present everywhere, and that although a guilty man may escape many a danger, he will not escape in the end.” [italics ours]

Chrysostom apparently is marvelled at how logical these ‘Maltese’ were in their reasoning. He uses their ‘analysis’ to oppose philosophers such as Sextus Empiricus (160–210 CE) and Carneades (214–129 CE), but perhaps especially Epicurus (342–271 BCE), on the question of Divine Providence.

Though clearly speculating, nonetheless Chrysostom’s commentary on the reasoning power of ancient ‘Maltese’ is quite charming. Anyway, his closing remark might be more telling, for “Let these barbarians shame us!” he concludes.

‘Cicero was here!’

Walking through the silent streets of Mdina, just into the main square in a discrete corner on your right you might notice a peculiar plaque with large Latin words and a (loose) translation of them in Maltese (picture on the left). The almost indistinct bronze bas-relief above the engraving leaves you clueless about the nature of the tablet, especially if you are a foreigner. You’ll probably walk on by and just won’t bother.

That would be a pity. The panel is a memorial to a visit to Malta made almost 2,100 years ago by the great Roman philosopher, orator and politician Cicero (106–43 BCE).

The bizarre inscription in fancy Latin goes something like this: “Marcus Tullius Cicero, the son of Mark and the grandson of Mark, the defender of the Maltese, most renowned Magistrate of the Roman people, later Praetorian and Consul of Rome, with Licinius Aristotle of Malta, in the year 679 since the foundation of Rome, here in this city of Melita, in this island of Malta, at his home resided.”

The bas-relief shows a stern-looking Cicero. The word ‘Melita’ is Mdina’s old name. As for the Maltese Aulus Licinius Aristotle, what is known about him is mostly legendary. We only know that he was Cicero’s close friend with whom he dwelled in Rome and whom he hosted at his home in Mdina. The curious year indicated in the plaque is 74 BCE — which is most probably wrong anyway.

Cicero had various sporadic dealings with Malta, mostly to combat a corrupt fellow Praetorian who had commissioned large thefts from Malta. At one time during the civil war between Caesar and Pompey, Cicero thought of exiling himself to Malta but never did.

Though the fact of Cicero’s visit to Malta seems reasonably certain from extant documents, it is not known with precision when this occurred. Neither is the reason for his stayover known for sure. It almost certainly had nothing to do with philosophy. It may have been related to some political muddle in which Cicero was frequently embroiled.

Whatever the case, a visit by so great a philosopher fans our vanity nonetheless.
Dear Editor, I have really enjoyed both Philosophy Sharing Foundation, and the activities you organise, as well as the recent debut issues of SHARE magazine. The talks were all to some degree interesting, some more engaging than others. I enjoyed Norman Lowell’s talk, although I don’t agree with some of his political views, and really admire your courage to grant him space and the right to express his views. I feel this Maltese patronising attitude of censoring people is quite pathetic. I think it is high time iconoclastic thinkers started to critically assess some Maltese authors and thinkers, and I do hope SHARE magazine will contribute in this regard.

– Martin Mangion, Sliema

Dear Editor, I came across your magazine at Malta International Airport and was quite overwhelmed to find such interesting articles. I enjoyed Kurt Borg’s article, and having recently attended the Valletta talks organised by the European Graduate School, I felt really happy Malta has taken up such initiatives. Good luck and please keep this project alive by allowing the ‘new’ generation to publish their ideas.

– Jason Ashote, Olso

Dear Editor, lovely front cover [Issue 2]: Krista Sullivan is one of Malta’s leading artists. I found Sophie Manduca’s art review so informing. As an artist myself, I think this magazine is simply NOW. Well done guys,

– Alex Bartes, Pembroke

Dear Editor, at our social club in Bugibba, among us expats from Eastern Europe, someone dropped us some copies of Share magazine. WE very much liked the articles on Žižek and in the other copy, the article on art and the one on money value gave us many thoughts and long talks. Please take your title seriously and SHARE more and more.

Lentush Strasha
Maxine Trosvksly
Zoran Peters
Dragan Mlaskres
CALL FOR ARTICLES

Submit an article for SHARE’s next issue (No. 4, January 2017) until 1st October 2016. Anyone may submit an article. However, it shall be the prerogative of the Editor to determine which contributions to include or exclude from the magazine. Articles are to be in English of more or less a 1,000 words. Any subject matter may be dealt with (no censorship shall be applied). However, articles must be of a philosophical nature (with theses supported by logical proof). Thought-provoking and stimulating contributions are preferred. Technical jargon is to be explained. References, if any, are to be placed within the text. The articles should not have been published elsewhere. Send your contribution (and a very brief CV) in Word format to: meinradcalleja55@yahoo.com.

You’re most welcome to share. Thank you.

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Get down to business! The Foundation’s learning season will soon take off. For the fifth term running, the Foundation is proud to offer you some of the best philosophy learning experiences around. This is a duty which the Foundation takes awfully seriously. So here is your chance to get into learning mode.

The courses this season are tailor-made just for you. They are of an intermediate level custom-made for participants with a basic-to-none philosophical background. The courses are brought to you by learners who are experts in each course’s respective field of learning. Be sure to grab this opportunity for all courses are one-offs, and won’t be repeated in the future.

The courses are all held between 6.30 PM and 8.00 PM (sharp) for five consecutive Mondays at the Volunteer Centre in Melita Street, Valletta – one block down from Auberge de Castille through St. Paul’s Street. They will be delivered in either Maltese or English as indicated below. Members of the Foundation and registered students only contribute €15 for each course. Everyone else contributes €30 for each course. Members of the public who choose to enroll and become Foundation members at one and the same time contribute just €25. All participants attending a second course or more shall have €5 deducted from their contribution.

Enrolment takes place on your first day at a course. No prior booking is necessary. Just present yourself and the rest will be taken care of. For more information: andrea.axisa@gmail.com

Here are the courses on offer this season. Happy learning!

### Introduction to Philosophy of the Orient
By: Walid Nabhan
Dates: 9 Jan - 6 Feb 2017

This course is mainly on Indian-Chinese philosophy with a special focus on Taoist philosophy, the great basis for understanding all dialectical matters. It is seriously a one-off chance which shouldn’t be missed.

### Neoliberalism
By: Ivan Attard
Dates: 3 - 31 October 2016

A highly topical subject which is much discussed but very little understood. Despite this, it seems to effect our lives more then we would like to think of it. What exactly is neoliberalism? Who practices it? Why is it important to know?

### The Nature of Truth
By: Karl Borg
Dates: 27 Feb - 27 Mar 2017

This promises to be a fascinating course. It will explore a myriad of themes touching upon what is usually taken to be the ‘truth’, indicating how to counter them and finding a way out of the maze. The course will be helpful for Matsec levels and Intermediate and university students.

### Paulo Freire
By: Prof. Carmel Borg
Dates: 20 Nov - 12 Dec 2016

The Brazilian Paulo Freire was an educationalist revolutionary. His ideas influenced generations of theorists and practitioners in the field of education. One question be answered: Why and how does education and learning become a tool of oppression? Should it?

### Philosophy of Architecture
By: Architect Prof. Lino Bianco
Dates: 10 Apr - 15 May 2017

A unique introductory course which is very unlikely to be found anywhere else offered to the general public. It will explore the philosophy of space, aesthetics, and the relations of architecture with identity and culture. Promises new and challenging stuff altogether!
PUBLIC TALKS & DISCUSSIONS – During the last months the Foundation continued with its monthly public talks and discussions with a steady step. On 6 April, Dr Joseph Ellul, a world-renowned Islamologist, discussed (in Maltese) whether Islam accepts the study of philosophy. On 4 May, Prof. Clare Vassallo, a linguist and expert on semiotics, discussed (in English) Umberto Eco’s semiotics and the meaning of meaning. On 3 June, the ‘Annual Philosophy Lecture’ activity was held. More about this further down. On 6 July, Vanni Pulè, a senior lecturer at the University of Malta Junior College, discussed (in English) sceptism and the role of doubt in the quest for objective truth. On 3 August, Meinrad Calleja, an expert on political and cultural hermeneutics, discussed (in English) the biopolitics of Integration while sharing philosophical reflections on immigration, warfare, and race. On 7 September, Vince Riolo, a logician, discussed constructive philosophy. Most of these events were held at the Valletta Volunteer Centre in Melita Street. Some were held at Luciano Restaurant in Merchants Street, Valletta. The talks can be viewed on the Foundation’s YOUTUBE channel.

ANNUAL PHILOSOPHY LECTURE – This year’s Annual Philosophy Lecture was delivered (in Maltese) by the educationist Karl Borg. This was the fourth edition of the event, during which Mr. Borg discussed the basis of philosophy and knowledge against the background of the mystery of existence and the human condition. The lecture, delivered in Maltese, was entitled: Il-Kurçifissjoni, Hampti Dumpti u l-hażi tal-filosofija u l-gharfien uman (The Crucifixion, Hampty Dumpty and the basis of philosophy and human knowledge). The august activity was held at the Centre for Creativity, St James Cavalier, Valletta. It was very well attended, and the discussion interesting and lively. This talk is also available on the Foundation’s YOUTUBE channel.

PHILOSOPHY COURSES – Another exciting season of philosophy courses is ready to go. Please see details on page 25. Do not hesitate to ask any questions you might have about the courses, their lecturers or any other information you might have by emailing us a note at this address: andrea.axisa@gmail.com. This is high quality learning on a silver spoon!

NEWSLETTER – Every three months the Foundation issues a two-page newsletter in Maltese for its members and anyone who would be like to be on its mailing list. The autumn issue has been been posted. The newsletter keeps you up to date on anything related to the Foundation’s activities. If you would like to begin receiving the publication, just drop a note at philosophysharingmalta@gmail.com. We will be pleased to oblige.

STEERING COMMITTEE – The Foundation is managed by a group of volunteers who take care of the day to day running of the Foundation. The group is called the ‘Steering Committee’. The committee is headed by the Director of the Foundation, Dr Max Cassar. The other members are the following with their respective responsibilities: Ivan Attard (Finance), Andrea Axisa (Courses), Ian Buttigieg (IT), Josephine Gatt Ciancio (Gozo), Mark Montebello (Secretary), Kevin Saliba (EU), and Mario Sciberras (SHARE). Andrea Zammit, who has been part of the committee since February 2015, shall be relinquishing his position due to studies abroad. The Steering Committee meets once a month to gauge the Foundation’s advancement, make plans, and coordinate activities according to Foundation’s Statute and the policies decided by all the Foundation’s members at Annual General Meetings.
STORY

A friend’s son was in the first grade of school, and his teacher asked the class, “What is the color of apples?” Most of the children answered red. A few said green. Kevin, my friend’s son, raised his hand and said white. The teacher tried to explain that apples could be red, green or sometimes golden, but never white. Kevin was quite insistent and finally said, “Look inside.” (Perception without mindfulness keeps us on the surface of things, and we often miss other levels of reality.)

"My philosophy is to think up a new philosophy whenever I need one."

1. What is greater than God, more evil than the devil, the poor have it, the rich need it, and if you eat it, you’ll die?
2. Who makes it has no need of it. Who buys it has no use for it. Who uses it can neither see nor feel it. What is it?
3. What is it that’s always coming but never arrives?
4. Brothers and sisters I have none. This man’s father is my father’s son. Who is the man?
5. Which word in the dictionary is spelled incorrectly?
6. What can travel around the world while staying in a corner?
7. What’s the art of not seeing what you see but make others see?

FREE WITH THIS ISSUE OF SHARE

This issue of SHARE includes another booklet in Maltese with a philosophical supplementary reading. The short text selected is from the writings of Plato, the great classical Greek philosopher of the 4th century BCE (called Platon in Maltese).

The selected text, translated into Maltese from the Greek original, is from Plato’s Laches. The dialogue is one of Plato’s first written works, if not the earliest, and as such is mostly intended to demonstrate the ‘Socratic method’. The selected part gives a good idea of this.

Translated into Maltese, the text may offer a glimpse into how apt the language is to render Plato’s Greek and turn of phrase. It is hoped that such short selections continue to encourage further work in the development of a philosophical terminology in the Maltese language.